Agents as gatekeepers to higher education

Facing continuous budget cuts, Canadian universities and colleges saw the eligibility of Indian students for the Student Direct Stream (SDS) visa as an opportunity to increase revenues. In an interview in The Runner, KPU’s student newsletter, the former provost acknowledged, “[it] has turned into an aggressive market” (cited in Keller, 2018, para. 8). KPU facilitated a sharp increase in PS admission, often at the expense of the quality of service these students received. An administrator shared,

We were given a target: “You need to double our international students in 12 months.” All we worked on was to expand and expand and recruit more students. But we are reaching the point right now to say, “Okay, we have enough agents. We really need to control the quality of them,” because more and more, students showed up here in Canada and got so lost. They’re in the wrong classes, they got the wrong information, they paid the wrong amount of money.

Lower-tier universities, unlike “super-league” institutions (Marginson, 2009, 2016), rely on recruitment agents to boost their global reputation (Coffey & Perry, 2013). KPU currently works with approximately 50 agents, many of whom operate in the Punjab area. Manpreet explained that “in Punjab, there are so many agents. Within 2–3 kms you can find every different agent.” Similarly, Punjab has an estimated 5000 + IELTS centers, the vast majority unregulated (Roy, 2019). The desire to come to Canada is so great that pop culture references IELTS and agents (Kahlon, 2021).

PS heavily rely on agents in the admission process; all the PS in this study used such services. Pravinder shared her rationale: “I don’t have much knowledge about…the whole process, and it was my first time. No one in my family has done this… So, instead of taking risks, I went to an agent.” Gagandeep felt similarly reassured by agents’ expertise:

I used an agent because I have heard about some people who did their process on their own, and…the applications got rejected because they missed something… Back in India, it’s considered best if you hire an agent so he could do good work for you.

In some non-Western cultures, there is a preference for mediation in important decision-making processes (Bodycott & Lai, 2012). Furthermore, IS from less-affluent backgrounds often require agents to navigate unfamiliar terrain (Pimpa, 2003) and help them “choose a country, institution, credentials, and course of study from a range of mostly unfamiliar options” (Coffey & Perry, 2013, p. 2). Most PS have limited knowledge of the options for international HE and assume all foreign institutions are quality ones, a belief that makes PS easy to manipulate (Kaur & Singh, 2018).

PS families willingly spend vast sums of money on agent services since studying abroad is seen as a means to advance their children’s future (Government of Punjab, 2020); however, information asymmetry underlies the admission process. An administrator explained:

It turns out that a lot of agents, they’re faking students’ personal emails. They actually create an email and tell us that it’s the students’ email. So, when we send all these communications to students, we thought the students got it, but students would show up and say, “I never received the information. I didn’t know the timeline. This is the wrong course…” Some agents, they create an email account that looks so similar to a personal email account. How would you know it’s not from the students?

Asymmetry in information can lead to cases of fraudulence (Tuxen & Robertson, 2018; Xu, 2020), as in the case above, where agents interrupted email correspondence between KPU and PS. Such interruptions can negatively impact relationship building between institutions and prospective students (Gomes & Murphy, 2003).

Since PS consider hiring an agent the safest route to international universities, agents have considerable power as gatekeepers of the admission process, which they can abuse. While agents can act as “cultural mediators,” bridging the gap between home and host countries (Robinson-Pant & Magyar, 2018), educational considerations do not necessarily play a central role in student recruitment (Baas, 2010; Caluya et al., 2011). Many PS shared how, in hindsight, agents did not always serve their best interests. Rajiv reflected,

When I think back, it was, for them, a business, so they didn’t give me honest advice…I actually trusted them blindly, but that was wrong…because these agents, maybe they have some links with KPU… Probably KPU pays them to “give us this many students.”

Indeed, agents have significant control over which universities and programs PS learn about. Offerings are often motivated by business considerations, as reflected in many PS stories, where they were only introduced to universities and colleges from the second tier or below. Prabhjeet shared,

No one was familiar with the process to get into UBC and SFU [research universities in BC]. I researched everything about UBC, and I came to know it’s one of the top universities in Canada. I was like, “I really want to go to that university” … But…I felt that nobody could help me with the application process. So, I had to drop that.

Similarly, when Rajdeep inquired about UBC, his agent claimed a transfer between institutions would be simple. However, as he shared, “once I contacted UBC after a semester at KPU, they said…they do not accept transfer students… So, I think that the agents were just doing it for their money, like they don’t really care where you go.”

While higher-tier universities did not even appear on agents’ lists, when it came to similarly ranked options, the selection process seemed market driven. Gagandeep shared,

The [agents] said, “Oh, we have one spot left at KPU, so if you want that, we can grab that for you.” So, I was really lucky to get this opportunity, I guess… because it depends more on the agent… They’re always like, “We don’t have seats for this, but we have another seat. If you want to take the seat, you have to go for this process now.”

Studies identify some benefits of using agents in a regulated and supervised environment (Collins, 2012; Thieme, 2017). Universities benefit from the agents’ local market understanding and their geographic, linguistic, and cultural knowledge while students and families benefit from support in the application process and beyond (Dunstan, 2009; Robinson-Pant & Magyer, 2018; Tian, 2017). However, as indicated above, numerous problems arise when agents work in an unregulated, competitive global context. Problems include a lack of transparency, conflicts of interests, “double dipping” for fees, and cases of fraudulence (Collins, 2012; Raimo et al., 2014; Tuxen & Robertson, 2018). While agents often base academic offerings on business considerations, their advice can have long-lasting impacts on PS’ academic trajectories.

The problem with institutional dependence on agents

Many PS received incorrect or misleading information about registration and course selection. When they arrived at KPU, it was often too late to change their courses, which placed them at an immediate academic disadvantage. Paramjit shared, “at the international orientation day there was a rush of international students…trying to talk to an advisor, but after the deadline, it’s not worth anything.” Many PS discovered last minute that agents had enrolled them in courses without their knowledge. Part of the confusion emerged because, within the Indian education system, students enrolled in academic streams (e.g., science, commerce, art) are automatically assigned a fixed set of courses. Thus, PS had no reason for concern when they were left out of KPU’s registration process. PS also had no way of anticipating a mismatch between program prerequisites in India and Canada.

In some cases, registration in the wrong courses had severe implications for PS’ academic trajectories. Since IS tuition at KPU is three times higher than domestic student tuition, every extra course PS require due to misinformation has significant financial implications. Sukhamdeep shared, “I was misguided with [my choice of program]. When I came to KPU, the advisors told me, ‘Yes, we can shift your program,’ but I already wasted my first semester. I wasted $7,000 directly when I came to KPU.” A KPU instructor offered an example of the consequences of agents’ registering on PS’ behalf:

A [PS] told me that she wanted to take sciences. That was her dream. The agent told her, “No problem. You’ll get into sciences.” But when she came here, she realized she didn’t have the math equivalency … She was never told that … They come here and realize they must pay more to get the required course.

KPU’s international office is aware of the crucial role agents play in PS’ academic success. As an administrator shared,

Whether it’s an agent not being fully trained about KPU’s programs or our requirements, or they just simply don’t follow it because of their own kind of purposes—I honestly don’t really know where each of the agents is coming from. One thing that I know is that the courses the agent helps the students register for in their first semester are crucial for the student’s continued education in a Canadian institution.

The international office aims to mitigate problems by vetting agents, providing better agent training, and circulating clear information. KPU offers time-limited contracts to agents, which they extend based on positive performance or terminate based on a record of recurring issues (students can also use “independent agents,” who are not contracted by an institution (Xu, 2020)). KPU’s international office also works to establish advance communication channels with IS to ensure students are correctly informed. As an administrator shared, “the purpose of it is…to have an opportunity to create a communication channel on a more one-on-one kind of a format without the agent being involved.”

While institutional changes are a step in the right direction, they cannot eliminate all problems that emerge from KPU’s dependence on agents. Providing effective supervision across linguistic, cultural, and geographical boundaries is complex (Coffey & Perry, 2013) and has become even more so with the emergence of “aggregator recruiters”—companies that take the role of middlemen between institutions and students, hiring and supervising agents en masse. A key player in the Canadian arena is ApplyBoard which, under the tagline, “Help us educate the world! We believe that education is a right, not a privilege” (ApplyBoard, 2021, para. 1), offers universities competitive rates coupled with less accountability. While the problems embedded in the agent model are striking, KPU, like other institutions whose enrollment depends on agents, “may be reluctant to confront agent misconduct for fear of having them refer students elsewhere” (Coffey & Perry, 2013, p. 2).

The notion of agents being, in the words of an administrator, “not really [KPU’s] representatives – but you know, sort of arms-length representatives in different countries” distorts the academic process. Although the agent model ostensibly maintains a non-selective admission process that fits KPU’s profile as an open access institution, it has a detrimental impact on PS retention and career advancement.

International students as “cash cows”

The BC provincial government regulates domestic student tuition, ensuring an increase of no more than 2% per academic year. International tuition, meanwhile, is unregulated. As a result, IS are exposed to unpredictable fluctuations in their tuition fees. An administrator explained, “There is no law that restricts us to increase international tuition by any specific percentage. So, there’s nothing stopping universities from increasing [it].” Indeed, in 2018, KPU, whose lower tuition was a key part of its appeal for many PS, increased international tuition by 15% (spread over two years). As a basis for the increase, the senate endorsement statement presented a table comparing KPU’s international tuition to other universities (KPU, 2018, p. 74). Another rationale behind the increase was IS’ need for more institutional services and support. KPU’s former provost told The Runner (Laube, 2018) that “paying for services such as academic advising, the multi-faith center, and peer tutoring…puts financial pressure on the university… in particular staffing the learning center and the KPU international office, as well as compensating recruiters and agents abroad” (para. 24). Notes from the board of governors meeting (KPU, 2018) state that “while year-over-year international revenues have increased by approximately 70%, agent commission fees have increased by over 220%. These fees…are now more than we spend on the international division itself” (p. 73). While KPU has seen a significant increase in revenues from international student tuition, considerable funds go toward maintaining its marketing mechanisms.

For many PS, the sudden increase in tuition had a devastating impact. Changes in immigration laws that made it easier for students to gain a post-graduate work permit (PGWP), a sub-category of TFW that, under certain conditions, can lead to PR, changed the makeup of the IS body (Beech, 2015, 2018). Many PS from non-affluent backgrounds apply to Canadian universities with the hope of a better life trajectory for themselves and their families, and parents often invest significant resources to send their children to study abroad (Baas, 2010; Brooks & Waters, 2011). An administrator explained,

A lot of people…they don’t really have the money. They have either taken loans, or they have sold property there. So, the expectations on a child coming here are very, very high. It’s like, “Hey, we’re selling our property. We’re selling our land. We’re sending you abroad to study. Make sure you do well.”

PS’ awareness of their families’ sacrifices increases the pressure they feel. Ravneet shared, “families put all their savings into this process, so that becomes a kind of pressure, a mental pressure, on the child, that he has to settle here on his own.” Pressure increases, too, if PS perform poorly academically. As Simran explained, “When I failed the courses, I wasn’t able to talk to my parents about that…I had to move to my friend’s house to pay the fees.”

PS have limited economic support from their families; most need to work to support themselves. The economic pressures impact PS engagement and academic success. An instructor shared, “It’s a typical story for PS where they would pull graveyard shifts and then go into my morning class.” Since student visas limit IS to a maximum of 20 h of work a week (Government of Canada, 2019c), many PS opt to work illegally, which can lead to work-based exploitation (Baughan & Minhas, 2018; Hune-Brown, 2021; Marom, 2021).

Wadhwa (2016) differentiates between Indian IS motivated by education/career advancement (those focused on institutional reputation, specific programs, etc.) and those seeking immigration. The PS in this study belong to the second category as they apply to lower-tier universities and non-prestigious programs. Yet this typology must be contextualized within the limited options for mobility available to PS based on their socio-economic status, ethnicity, and the specific circumstances of the Punjab region. Enrolling in a lower-tier university with high market dependency, PS education-migration was underlined by education distortions, starting with admission, continuing with program and course selection, and intensifying with unexpected tuition hikes. PS found themselves in a vulnerable position where their educational trajectory had landed them in an “opportunity trap” (Brown et al., 2011, p. 133). With much at stake, PS still had to secure a route to migration.

University as a route to low-skilled jobs

Canada has recently put regulations in place to limit international recruiters’ ability to exploit low-skilled workers (e.g., for agriculture and elderly care) from developing countries (Agunias, 2013; Barrientos, 2013; Tomlinson, 2019). This has had a ripple effect on education-migration, with “study permits… [becoming] the new hot seller for recruiters, who can then steer the students to low-skilled jobs with their employer clients” (Tomlinson, 2019, para. 23). Since the 2016 inclusion of India in the SDS, study permits have become popular with PS as a pathway to Canada. This phenomenon adds to the image of PS as immigration seekers rather than “real students” (Baas, 2010; Caluya et al., 2011).

The intertwined nature of education and migration shows itself in PS enrollment patterns. While 77% of domestic students study toward an undergraduate degree, the majority of PS (52%) enroll in two-year diploma programs (KPU, 2020b). Many PS indicated that they could not afford four years of international tuition. Academic challenges coupled with tuition hikes drove others to downgrade their program of study to a less demanding one. Seven of the participants changed their program of study from a specialized one (e.g., business or IT) to General Studies. In the graduation roll for the 2019/2020 class, the overwhelming majority listed under “Diploma in General Studies” are PS (KPU, 2020a). An administrator explained this phenomenon:

It’s an easy way out…that’s what they care about. For General Studies, they can take random classes, and they will graduate, which will allow them to get a work permit so they can work after graduation. Some say that they will come back once they have immigrated, as domestic students, because the difference in tuition is quite substantial. But we never know. A lot of them just graduate with General Studies and never come back.

While many PS explained their decision to switch programs in terms of time and monetary constraints, their stories did not carry the deficit overtone of the comment above. Many interviewees indicated that they did not apply to KPU with the intention to take a general program, but resorted to this option due to their inability to overcome the multiple challenges they encountered along the way. PS named a few reasons for switching to General Studies, such as the higher cost of specialized courses (e.g., advanced four-credit courses and labs), waitlists for mandatory courses in specific programs, and the fear of failing courses which, in addition to having an economic impact, could lead to academic probation or expulsion. Internal data reveals that in the 2018/2019 academic year, 21% of KPU’s IS were on academic probation (in comparison to 5% of domestic students). As Harvir shared,

[In General Studies] I was sure about the courses that I could pass. If I fail a course, I will have to pay that 4 × more again, and I would be at a big risk to proceed in this country… If I don’t get good grades, I won’t even be able to start my life here. It will end before it even starts, right?

Some PS who sought academic advising received generic advice on the easiest courses for an expeditious graduation. Sukhamdeep shared, “It’s like the academic advisors only feel that we are here to get PRs, so they just tell us which way we won’t face difficulties in getting PR or a work permit in the future. But they don’t think we even have to complete our studies.” Similarly, in a study on IS at lower-tier universities in immigrant-dependent countries, Tran and Thao (2016) argued that administrators’ and faculty’s perception of students as mere “migration hunters” impacted the academic support they received.

While the Canadian immigration model is globally praised for matching its labor market needs with migration trends (OECD, 2019), education-migration is questionable in terms of IS’ job prospects (Choi et al., 2021). A report by Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) (2015) states that, “While some find skilled work, data indicates that a large proportion of PGWP holders are working in low-skill/low-wage jobs” (p. 9) (in 2019, 54.5% of PGWP holders originated from India). Furthermore, Chen and Skuterud (2021) argue that IS transitioning to PR “experience disparities in labor market outcomes relative to their domestic counterparts graduating from similar academic programs” (p. 126); disparities can persist “for as long as 20 years” (p. 126) and are evident in earnings, employment rates, and the mismatch between education levels and jobs.

My study similarly suggests that the academic trajectory of PS at lower-tier universities leads to low-skilled jobs (IRCC, 2018). PS credentials and limited work experience hardly put them in a position to “win” in Canada’s competitive “express entry” PR category, where they share the applicant pool with PhD graduates and internationally educated professionals (Hou et al., 2020). Hence, despite investing considerable money and effort, PS often graduate with a diploma that leads to a limited career trajectory. An alternative route to PR is through TFW status, particularly via jobs that qualify for the Labour Market Impact Assessment (LMIA). LMIA justifies hiring foreign workers where no Canadian candidates can be found, often for labor-intensive jobs or jobs in remote locations. LMIA policy leads to fraud by “ghost consultants” who charge thousands of dollars for LMIA, and by employers who provide IS with LMIA in return for cheap or free labor (Dahmi, 2021; Kahlon, 2021). The BC government has created a system of reporting LMIA fraud (BC Government, 2021); arguably, this system is “too little too late” to negate the exploitative construction of education-migration, particularly for students in lower-tier universities and generalized programs.

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